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Abstract 
 
Recent studies have challenged the view that trade openness leads to more specialization in 
countries’ trade. Using a panel of 116 countries over 35 years, we show that openness can be 
positively associated with both specialization and diversification, depending on the measure 
used. Moreover, for developing countries in our sample, the effect of openness on trade structure 
depends on the type of political regime: in autocracies openness is linked with specialization, 
whilst in democracies it is related to diversification via export sophistication.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Openness has often been associated with more specialization (see, e.g. Imbs, 2004, including a 
short review of literature), yet greater specialization is a channel for increased macroeconomic 
volatility (Giovanni and Levchenko, 2009). However, recent findings suggest that the effect of 
openness on specialization is not unambiguous. For example, Dennis and Shepherd (2011) show 
improved trade facilitation enhances export diversification in developing countries. Moreover, 
Jacks et al. (2011) suggest that the effects of globalization on specialization might be different 
within different time periods, and specifically that, “specialization is not given, but rather is 
endogenous to political regimes” (cit. op., p. 810). The latter is exactly the point we address in 
this paper. 
 
Employing two different measures of export diversification, we find that openness can be shown 
to have positive effect on each of them. The first measure is the Cadot et al. (2011) export 
diversification index; where a higher value of the index indicates lower diversification thus it 
could also be referred to as a measure of export specialization. The second measure is export 
sophistication, developed by Hausmann et al. (2007). This index measures the benefits of 
diversifying the economy away from low productivity goods, primary products, to high 
productivity goods, manufacturing and services. A higher value of this index implies higher 
manufacturing and services production.  
 
To explore the issue further, we divide developing countries into democracies and autocracies, 
demonstrating that increased openness pushes autocracies towards specialization, and 
democracies – towards sophistication of their exports. We conclude that the impact of openness 
on export diversification strongly depends on the type of the political regime. 
 
2. Data 
 
We collect data for 116 countries, among which 88 are developing and 28 developed, over the 
period from 1970 to 2005. The export specialization index comes from the IMF1. The export 
                                                          
1 https://www.imf.org/external/np/res/dfidimf/diversification.htm 
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sophistication index is from Cavalcanti et al. (2014). Both are continuous variables. Trade 
Openness is the ratio of exports and imports to GDP from the World Bank WDI dataset.2 The 
democracy index comes from Cheibub et al. (2010). This index is a dummy coded 1 for a 
democratic political regime that matches all the following conditions: the effective executive and 
legislature are elected (either directly or indirectly), the existence of parties apart from the 
governing party, the existence of multiple parties within the legislature, the alternation rule is 
not violated, and the incumbents (person, party, military hierarchy) do not unconstitutionally 
close the lower house of the national legislature and rewrite the rules in their favor. The 
sources of other variables, used as controls (human capital, exchange rate regime and GDP per 
capita) are Cavalcanti et al. (2014), Shambaugh (2004), and the World Bank WDI dataset 
respectively. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
We transform the annual series into non-overlapping five-year averages with a maximum of 
seven observations per country. This captures the medium and long-term impact of openness 
(Cavalcanti et al., 2014) and is important, given it takes time for national production and export 
structures to respond to changes in openness. Additionally, the five-year averages are typically 
considered reasonable to smooth out business cycle fluctuations.  
 
Let 𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑠  denote the (first-difference of the logarithm of an) export diversification index, either 
export specialization or export sophistication, depending on the model, in the ith country at time 
s, which designates one of the five-year averages. We estimate the following first-difference 
model:  
 
𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑠 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝛽2 𝑋𝑖𝑠 + 𝛿𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠                                                                        (1) 
 
                                                          
2 By far the most popular measure of openness used in the literature is the ratio of exports and imports to GDP. As 
Dowrick and Golley (2004) mention, it has the advantage of being ‘clearly defined and well measured.’ Unlike some 
other measures, the constituent data is available over the long timespan used in our study. Useful surveys of other 
measures include Dowrick and Golley (2004), Spilimbergo et al. (1999) and Pritchett (1996). 
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where 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠 is the (first-difference of the logarithm of) trade openness;  Xis  is a set of 
control variables that includes the initial value of GDP per capita in the beginning of each five-
year period, human capital growth, and the exchange rate regime dummy; δs  is a time-specific 
effect; and  εis is the error term.   
 
We estimate (1) with panel least squares using cluster standard errors to control for 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. The first-difference model eliminates the unobserved 
country-specific effects that differ across countries but are time-invariant (such as size and 
geographical conditions) and deals with the non-stationary behavior of export specialization, 
export sophistication and openness3. We first estimate (1) for the whole sample and then sub-
samples of developed and developing economies. Subsequently, we subdivide the samples into 
autocracies and democracies to test whether political regime affects the nexus between export 
diversification and openness.4 
 
4. Results 
 
Table 1 presents the results of estimating (1) for our whole sample and two subsamples: 
developing countries and developed countries. The results show that openness plays an essential 
role in determining the export pattern in developing countries, whilst the effect is insignificant in 
developed countries. The latter is due to the lack of medium and long-term variability in 
openness and export diversification in developed countries. However, the significant role of 
openness in the developing world looks puzzling at first glance, as openness appears to enhance 
both export specialization and sophistication in developing countries as shown in columns 2 and 
5 respectively.  
 
We can clarify the openness/export diversification nexus in developing countries by considering 
the role of political regimes. Given the above analysis does not reveal any significant 
                                                          
3 Fisher-type panel unit root tests show the log of export specialization, export sophistication and openness are I(1). 
However, cointegration tests provide evidence of no cointegration between openness, on the one hand, and export 
specialization or export sophistication, on the other. 
4 This approach is analogous to including the interaction terms between the openness variable and the political 
regime dummies in (1). However, we run separate sub-sample regressions to show explicitly the number of 
observations in each category.  
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relationship between openness and diversification in developed countries5, we now focus on 
developing countries only. The results of the re-estimation of (1) for developing autocracies and 
democracies separately are in Table 2. Strikingly, openness enhances export specialization in 
autocracies but export sophistication in democracies. The political regime is clearly crucial in 
determining the type of relationship between openness and diversification. 
 
Table 1: Trade Openness, Export Specialization and Export Sophistication 
Dependent variable: Export Specialization Export Sophistication 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All 
 countries 
Developing 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
All  
countries 
Developing 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
Openness  0.047* 0.050* 0.039 0.082*** 0.083*** 0.023 
 (1.86) (1.77) (0.52) (2.87) (2.67) (0.57) 
Constant -0.019*** -0.004 -0.077 0.024*** 0.023* 0.042 
 (-3.88) (-0.62) (-1.48) (3.31) (1.93) (1.53) 
Time Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country/Obs. 113/689 85/513 28/176 116/666 88/490 28/176 
Adjusted R2 0.045 0.029 0.117 0.100 0.100 0.277 
t statistics in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Controls include ln(Initial GDP per capita), human 
capital growth, and the exchange rate regime dummy. 
 
 
Table 2: Democracy, Trade Openness, Export Specialization and Export Sophistication in 
Developing countries 
Dependent variable: Export Specialization Export Sophistication 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Developing 
Autocracies 
Developing 
Democracies 
Developing 
Autocracies 
Developing 
Democracies 
Openness  0.077** -0.002 0.066 0.108*** 
 (2.39) (-0.05) (1.58) (2.70) 
Constant -0.003 -0.003 0.027 0.026 
 (-0.44) (-0.26) (1.57) (1.45) 
Time Dummies Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y 
Obs. 320 193 305 185 
Adjusted R2 0.058 0.003 0.080 0.154 
t statistics in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Controls include ln(Initial GDP per capita), human 
capital growth, and the exchange rate regime dummy. 
 
 
                                                          
5 It should be noted that the vast majority of developed countries in our sample are democratic, with only 7 
observations in the developed/autocracy subsample. This lack of observations provides another reason why 
developed countries are omitted in the subsequent analysis of the effects of political regime. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
As discussed in the introduction, specialization induced by trade openness might be harmful for 
economies as it can lead to higher macroeconomic volatility. Our results suggest that over the 
medium to long-run, the effect of openness, as measured by the trade-to-GDP ratio, is negligible 
on specialization for developed countries. However, openness can be either curse or blessing for 
developing countries, leading either to more export specialization or more export sophistication. 
It is the type of political regime that, in the developing country context, determines the effect of 
openness on export diversification. 
 
We find a positive effect of openness on specialization in developing autocracies which can be 
explained by ruling elites seeking the easiest gains from international trade by focusing solely on 
products that deliver the highest return. In contrast with autocracies, democracies care more 
about sustainable growth. This explains why we find that openness is positively associated with 
export sophistication in developing democracies, as they diversify away from low productivity 
primary products, to high productivity manufacturing and services goods. At the same time, 
autocracies are known to resist to modernization policies such as industrialization and 
confirming this, we find that more openness does not lead to a change in their export 
sophistication. Given export sophistication has been shown to be “a strong and robust predictor 
of subsequent economic growth” (Hausmann et al., 2007, p.3), these differential effects of 
openness, mediated via political regime, have important implications. 
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